During the 1990s, concerns that nonprofit (NP) hospitals were being sold at below-market prices to investor-owned (IO) chains helped to prompt the widespread adoption of state laws regulating the sale and conversion of nonprofits. In this paper we provide tests of under-pricing, both before and after state laws were adopted. Because NP CEOs and boards do not share in the sale proceeds, it may appear that they lack incentives to negotiate vigorously for fair market prices. However, incremental sale proceeds can be used to fund community benefits such as charitable foundations, which are also valued by CEOs and boards. In our empirical section, we use abnormal returns at the time of the acquisition to measure the extent of under-pricing. Absent regulation, IO chains did not earn abnormal returns from their transactions with NPs and benefited more by transacting with other IO and privately-owned hospitals. In states that subsequently adopted regulations, acquisition activity slowed significantly and acquirer returns became negative.
Introduction
During the decade of the nineties, numerous nonprofit (NP) hospitals were acquired by investor-owned (IO) hospital chains 1 . In some of these transactions, regulators voiced concerns that the NP targets were being sold at prices below their market value. For example, in 1996 the California Attorney General halted the sale of Sharp Memorial Hospital to Columbia/HCA. He threatened to hold the board of Sharp
Memorial Hospital liable because they accepted an offer from Columbia/HCA that was $200 million less than competing offers 2 . Shortly thereafter, California passed a law regulating the sale and conversion of NP hospitals. Ultimately, 24 states and the District of Columbia enacted legislation to regulate the sale and conversion of nonprofit hospitals, primarily during the time period from 1997-1998. In virtually all cases, the legislation contained provisions to ensure that the acquirer paid a fair market price for the NP target.
In this paper we test the hypothesis that NP hospitals targeted for acquisition by IO chains were priced below their market value, especially prior to 1997. Specifically, we test whether IO chains earned excess returns from NP acquisitions prior to 1997 and whether these returns abated in the aftermath of the state legislation. The topic we propose is important for at least two reasons. First, the perception of under-pricing (selling at a price below market value) was at least partially the basis of widespread regulation, as noted above. Second, under-pricing and the effects of regulation may help to explain the cycle of acquisition activity in the hospital sector over the past decade 3 .
Public concerns over the prices paid for NP entities are rooted in agency problems that arise where the decision-makers are not also the residual claimants [Fama and Jensen (1983) ]. The concerns of regulators are consistent with the view that nonprofit managers and boards lack the incentives to bargain for a fair price because they do not share in the proceeds from the sale. Parties such as the IRS are also concerned that financial promises of highly-paid employment further weaken the incentives of NP CEOs to bargain with their IO acquirers 4 .
However, applications of agency theory do not necessarily predict under-pricing.
First, if there are many bidders for the target, the acquirer will be forced to bid a fair market price for the target's assets to outbid its rivals. Second, given that managers and board members do not benefit financially from the sale, they may be reluctant to relinquish control of their organizations 5 . The reluctance to sell may raise their reservation price such that the acquirer's bid must be increased in order to fund community benefits that the board finds valuable. For example, the acquiring entity may be forced to pay a high price for the acquisition in order to generously fund a charitable foundation that board members will manage. Alternatively, the acquirer may be forced to pay off the organization's debts so that the board can avoid the embarrassment of bankruptcy and have something to show for the transaction 6 .
In our empirical section, we use event studies to test for fair market pricing both before and after the passage of state regulations designed to prevent under-pricing.
We argue that if IO chains fail to realize abnormal returns from their acquisitions of NP hospitals, then this is consistent with a rigorous standard of fair market pricing 7 8 . Based on this standard, our event study results provide no systematic evidence that nonprofit hospitals were ever under-priced. Our estimates of acquirer abnormal returns are statistically indistinguishable from zero across all time periods. To validate these findings, we also examine acquisition prices for those transactions where the prices are reported. Controlling for target attributes including net income and bed size, we find no statistically significant difference between the prices that IO chains paid for NP and IO targets.
Following the passage of state regulations, we also find a statistically significant drop in the number of nonprofit acquisitions and no such drop in unregulated states. This drop is consistent with the hypothesis that regulations placed a floor under NP acquisition prices that was above the targets' synergistic values to acquirers. We also find that acquirer abnormal returns fell following the passage of state regulations and became significantly negative in states that adopted regulations. Returns remained zero in states that did not adopt regulations. 7 There is a well established literature in finance that relies on announcement date abnormal returns to assess the value implications of acquisitions, including studies that test whether bidders pay less than the expected value of the target. Examples include: Asquith, et al. (1983) , Bradley, et al. (1988) , Jarrell and Bradley (1980) , and Jarrell, et al. (1988) . 8 Interestingly, the converse doesn't hold. It's possible that IO chains could realize positive abnormal returns from their acquisitions of NP targets and still have the sale transacted at fair market value. This could occur, for example, where the acquirer generates unique synergies with the target. In such a case, a weak test of fair market pricing would require that acquirer abnormal returns be equivalent whether the target is for-profit or nonprofit. This test assumes that synergies are equal across target ownership classifications.
While our results are subject to the limitations that characterize all event studies, they lead us to question state regulations designed specifically to enforce fair market pricing. They also imply that regulations reduced the number of NP acquisitions by IO chains. The justification for regulation, therefore, must be based on the argument that NPs provide a social dividend not replicable under for-profit ownership. From a behavioral perspective, our results suggest that NP managers and their boards are reluctant to yield control of their institutions and, to do so, often require a premium over the price that would be demanded by a publicly-traded target.
Our paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we discuss trends in hospital acquisitions over the past decade and provide a simple framework to interpret the results of event studies in the market for hospital acquisitions. Section 3 discusses our data and the methods that we use to test these hypotheses. Results are provided in section 4. We conclude in section 5. 
Background and Theory

Historical Background
State Regulations
From a community perspective, the sale and conversion of nonprofit hospitals raises several concerns. These include: 1) whether a fair price is paid for the NP entity;
2) whether the proceeds inure to a private party; and 3) whether the FP entity will supply community benefits or whether the proceeds of the sale can be used to fund these benefits. The state's attorney general (AG) is charged with oversight of these transactions to guard against abuses and to ensure the satisfaction of various aspects of the state's laws concerning nonprofit entities 10 . For example, the state's AG may bring 10 In practice, the complete sale of NP hospitals in the 1990s generally resulted in the creation of a charitable foundation whose mission was to serve charitable purposes in the community, such as the general promotion of health. During the 1990s, 81 charitable foundations were created from the conversions of hospital and health systems [Grantmakers in Health, (2001) ]. In some cases, distressed nonprofits were paid amounts sufficient to only retire their debt, with no funds left to fund a foundation.
suit against the parties to the acquisition if she believes that laws regarding the disposition of proceeds have been violated 11 .
In spite of existing state AG oversight, the rapid growth in nonprofit hospital conversions prompted calls for additional state regulations. These regulations implemented procedures to assist the state AG's review of these transactions. State regulations were arguably necessary to: 1) extend the scope of reviewable transactions (e.g., to partial sales of NP assets); 2) provide for advance notice to the state's AG so that objections could be voiced in a timely fashion; 3) mandate disclosure of all pertinent information to the public and the state's AG; 4) guard against private inurement of sale proceeds; 5) ensure clarity in the role of the state's AG and guarantee aggressive review of all such transactions; and 6) codify procedures that would ensure payment of a fair price for the target, such as formal appraisals [Butler, (1997 ), Shriber, (1997 . A good example is the 1996 Nebraska law. This law contained provisions to address all of the above-cited motivations. It also required a community assessment of the effects of any such conversion on health access. The Nebraska law became a model for many state laws.
News publications frequently cited potential under-pricing of the NP entity as a motivation for the legislation 12 . State legislation addressed these concerns by requiring formal notification, review and information revelation.
Agency and Under-Pricing of NP Targets
Agency theory makes ambiguous predictions about the under-pricing of NP hospitals. Under-pricing concerns are based on the perception that NP managers lack incentives to negotiate vigorously for fair market prices for their institutions. They arguably lack incentives because they do not directly benefit from the sale price. In the extreme, it has been argued that NP managers may accept lucrative employment contracts as an inducement to sell at a discount.
However, the existence of several bidders may make the bargaining efforts of NP managers and boards irrelevant. A competitive auction of the NP's assets will naturally lead to a fair market price. Even where competitive market conditions do not hold, the inability to benefit financially may make nonprofit managers reluctant to sell their hospital at all. Managers and boards of nonprofits arguably have much to lose and little to gain from the sale of their hospital to a FP corporation. The target's managers are likely to lose their jobs while boards lose control, political power and influence. As such, an IO acquirer can increase the likelihood of a successful bid for a NP by increasing the bid price. From the NP board's perspective, a higher bid price can be used to better fund a resulting charitable foundation that the board may control or point to as a positive by product of the merger 13 . A higher price can also be used to pay off a financially distressed hospital's bonds, so that the board can avoid the embarrassment of presiding over a bankruptcy. Additional proceeds can be used to fund promises to the community such as the continuation of unprofitable hospital services, the provision of minimum amounts of charity care or the renovation and replacement of the existing hospital facility. Some of these costs are not reflected in the nominal price of the bid, but nonetheless raise the effective price in relation to the target's synergistic value to the acquirer.
The existence of systemic under-pricing prior to regulation is, therefore, an empirical issue. The question is whether weak incentives to negotiate dominate the forces of competition and the reluctance NP managers to sell at all. The empirical relationship between fair market prices and abnormal stock returns offers one strategy to resolve the issue.
Fair Market Prices and Abnormal Returns
Definition of Fair Market Pricing
"Fair market value" is defined by the American Society of Appraisers as "The amount at which property would change hands between a willing seller and a willing buyer when neither is acting under compulsion and when both have reasonable knowledge of the relevant facts" [Pratt et al. (2000) ]. A violation of fair market pricing occurs where, for example, the price is influenced by "special motivations or characteristic of a typical buyer or seller" [Pratt et al. (2000) ]. Thus, a community may reasonably expect its nonprofit board to negotiate a price corresponding to an anonymous auction of the asset to the highest bidder, without the manager taking personal interest in the transaction. This is the first standard of fair market pricing that we wish to test empirically.
Note that this definition of fair market pricing permits the acquirer to retain profits from the sale. For example, where the acquirer possesses unique synergies with the target, it may be able to capture some value by offering the same price offered by the 13 Foundations resulting from hospital conversions were frequently managed by members of the hospital's board of directors.
bidder with the second highest synergy value (the "second price bid"). The difference in synergy value between the highest and second highest bidders accrues to the winning bidder in this case.
A second, stricter standard of fair market pricing requires the seller to receive not only the second price bid for the target, but to also bargain for some of the value that would otherwise accrue to the winning bidder. In this regard, a community may reasonably ask its NP managers and board to negotiate as aggressively as FP managers over the acquirer's remaining surplus.
Abnormal Returns and Fair Market Pricing
We now consider how the acquirer's cumulative abnormal stock return (CAR) at the time of the acquisition can be used to test both standards of fair market prices 14 .
Under certain reasonable assumptions, abnormal stock returns around the time of an acquisition measure the market's assessment of the acquisition's net effect on the acquirer's market value. Where the acquirer pays less than the target's expected value, the abnormal return is positive and vice versa 15 .
Given these assumptions acquirer CARs may be either zero or positive 16 . Where IO chains earn zero CARs from their purchases of NP targets, we assert that this finding 14 A cumulative abnormal stock return (CAR) refers to the sum in acquiring firms returns that are over and above those that would otherwise be predicted conditional on the market's return. A formal definition is provided in section 3. 15 The "reasonable assumptions" that we refer to include the following: a) markets are efficient and b) the value associated with the acquisition is not anticipated by the market prior to the measured event window. In practice, CARs are subject to alternative interpretations that we consider in the paper's empirical section. For example, the CAR at the time of an acquisition may reflect additional information signaled by the acquisition, such as the relative availability of good investment opportunities for the acquirer. Or CARs may fail to reflect an acquisition's value if it has been previously anticipated and capitalized by the market. Our discussion in this section operates under the assumption that CARs fully and exclusively reflect the net present value of the acquisition. 16 That is, negative CARs are inconsistent with rational acquirer behavior. However, they may be observed if, for some reason, the acquirer overpays for the target or if the acquisition signals other negative is consistent with both definitions of fair market pricing discussed above. The price associated with a zero CAR must represent the highest price that could be offered in an arm's length auction of the target, assuming that no party would offer a price that yields a negative CAR. Similarly, if the acquirer has unique synergies with the target, an acquirer CAR of zero implies that the target has bargained all of the synergies into the bid price.
Interestingly, a positive acquirer CAR does not necessarily imply that a NP target has been sold at less than fair market value. As noted above, a positive CAR may indicate that the acquirer creates unique synergies with the target. Even if IO chains earn systematically higher CARs by acquiring NP rather than IO targets, this may also be consistent with fair market pricing. For example, IOs may earn higher CARs from NP targets simply because the differences between acquirer synergy value and second price bids are greater among nonprofit targets. There is little that can be inferred about fair market prices in relation to positive acquirer CARs without making additional assumptions.
One useful assumption is that the structure of the market for acquisitions is the same across NP and IO targets 17 . For convenience, we refer to this as the symmetry assumption. If this assumption holds, then where we observe zero CARs among the set of (IO/IO) transactions, we infer a competitive acquisition market and by the symmetry assumption we expect zero CARs in the (IO/NP) acquisition market as well. Therefore, it would be of some interest to observe results where IO chains earn zero CARs from IO information about the acquirer's value. Our discussion above implies that negative CARs are inconsistent with under-payment for NP targets, so we do not consider them here. 17 We define the structure of the acquisition market as the number of bidders as well as the distribution of target synergy values across bidders. Where market structures are identical, this implies that the difference between synergy values to the top bidder and the second highest bidder are equal, for example. CARs are no larger for NP targets than for FP targets.
Abnormal Returns and Regulation
Regulations of the sale and conversion of NP hospitals have two potential effects on the acquisitions market. First, regulations may redistribute incremental value created from acquisitions. For example, more synergy value may be transferred to the NP target's owners, the community. Second, regulations may also impose costs on acquirers and thereby reduce the value of the target 18 . We consider the relationships between the imposition of regulations, acquirer CARs and the number of transactions, post-regulation, to makes inferences about these two effects.
Consider, first, the case where the acquirer CARs realized from acquiring NP targets are zero, prior to imposing regulations. Presumably, acquirers are not willing to accept negative CARs, so no change in observed CARs is expected, post-regulation.
Suppose, however, that the number of acquisitions falls post-regulation. This implies that for many potential acquisitions the regulations impose a price floor than exceeds the target's value. These deals do not occur under regulation.
18 State regulations cause delays related to notification of the state's AG. Some laws require the payment of fees to outside experts, as well as community assessments and ongoing monitoring of the impact of the acquisition on community health. Assessments and monitoring may lead to mandates to provide charity care after the merger is completed.
A related question is whether a fall in the number of transactions also implies that regulations impose costs that reduce the synergistic value of the target. This need not be the case. For example, regulations may force target prices above their synergistic value without reducing that value. On the other hand, suppose that both the number of transactions and the average price of targets fall post-regulation. This can only occur where the value of targets has fallen as well due, presumably, to the cost of regulation. transactions is due to a reallocation of value, an imposition of costs or both.
Data and Methods
Data
Our data comprise a near census of all acquisitions involving publicly-traded IO hospitals between the years 1990-2001, including data on hospital acquisition prices, acquiring and/or target firm stock returns and target hospital financial performance at the time of the acquisition. The transactions include both sales and purchases of single and multiple hospitals by publicly-traded hospital companies 19 .
We obtain a list of acquisitions for the years 1994-2001, inclusive, from reports published by Irving Levin and Associates, which list all hospital mergers and acquisitions 19 In transactions where the target is publicly-traded, the sale typically represents only a fraction of the hospitals owned by the target (e.g., Columbia/HCA sells a single hospital to Tenet). Where a NP is the target, the sale is more likely to include all of the NP corporation's assets and the creation of a charitable foundation.
on an annual basis 20 . These reports list the transacting parties, their ownership status (publicly-traded, private for-profit or nonprofit), the announcement date, the purchase price of the target, (if disclosed) and other terms of the deal. We subsequently verify the announcement dates 21 .
We use three other data sources to extend the time frame of our study back to Key financial data include the target's net income and bed size.
Finally, we compile a list of enactment dates for state legislation regulating the sale and conversion of nonprofit hospitals. From this list, we create a series of dummy variables to indicate whether each of our transactions occurred in a state where legislation had previously been enacted. Table 2 provides a list of the 24 states that enacted legislation, along with enactment dates, key provisions of the legislation and the number of (IO-NP) acquisitions that occurred before and after enactment. Table 2 shows that most legislation required an assessment of the health impact of the acquisition (e.g., likely effects on charity care), but few states required formal outside assessments of the target's value. We return to this point in section 4.
Methodology
Event Studies
To provide tests of fair market pricing and the effects of the regulation, we rely primarily upon measurements of acquirer abnormal returns derived from event studies 24 .
Abnormal returns are equal to the residual from a market model of expected returns at the time of an acquisition. They measure the difference between the expected present value of cash flows from the acquisition target and the price paid. For example, suppose an investor-owned firm with a market value of $1 billion acquires a hospital with expected cash flows (in present value) of $100 million for a price of $80 million. In an efficient market, the value of the investor-owned firm should increase from $1 billion to $1.02 billion. The abnormal return (market model residual) is expected to be 2%.
Because univariate tests of CARs provide the main tests of our hypotheses, it is crucial that we establish their statistical power given our sample sizes and the likely magnitudes of effects. To assess the power of our univariate tests, we first consult simulation results provided by MacKinlay (1997) . For event windows with estimated standard errors similar to ours, the likelihood of detecting a 2% CAR using a sample of 100 events is virtually 100%. There is a 96% likelihood of detecting a 1.5% CAR and 71% likelihood of detecting a 1% CAR. Because we have in excess of 100 (IO-NP) events, we are confident that our methodology is able to detect even reasonably small abnormal returns that resulted from IO chains acquiring NP entities.
To complete our analysis of power, we assess the likely magnitude of the CAR, conditional on under-pricing. We wish to show that, conditional on under-pricing, acquisition of a NP target will lead to a detectable CAR. In our sample, the mean value of NP target assets to IO acquirer market capitalization is 6%. If each dollar of the NP target's assets is worth one dollar of market capitalization, (i.e, equivalent to a Tobin's "q" of 1 for NP assets), then the IO acquirer would realize a 6% CAR if it acquired the NP target for free. More realistically, the acquirer would realize a CAR of 2% if it achieved a 33% under-pricing discount in the acquisition of the target's assets (i.e., paying out 4% of its value to acquire an additional 6%). We conclude that significant amounts of under-pricing of NP assets should lead to measurable acquirer CARs 25 .
Calculation of CARs
We employ a standard market model to calculate cumulative abnormal returns.
Given that our study is industry specific, we add industry returns as a second factor to the market model. We first estimate market model parameters for each acquiring firm using daily returns over the period t=-180 to t= -5. Abnormal returns are estimated as follows:
where 25 Moreover, our simple analysis understates the likely magnitude of acquirer CARs because we do not consider possible synergies. 
Limitations of Event Studies
The abnormal returns derived from event studies are subject to a variety of interpretations. If we find that acquiring firms earn no abnormal returns at the time of their acquisitions, then this is consistent with the hypothesis that NP targets are priced fairly. However, zero abnormal returns may also occur where the market has already anticipated the target's gains from its acquisition. The market may anticipate such gains ahead of time if the firm has announced an acquisition program and the terms of subsequent deals (both synergies and acquisition prices) conform to the prior expectations of the market [Schipper and Thompson, (1983) ]. The market may also anticipate the gains if the acquisition and its terms are leaked prior to the announcement 26 We also use several other measures of abnormal returns including firm specific returns minus market returns, firm specific market returns minus mean firm specific returns prior to the event period and the returns from a one factor market model. Results are qualitatively similar using all of these measures and are available from the authors upon request. 27 As a robustness check, we examine CARs of multiple window lengths, ranging from three to six days. Arguably a three day window length provides the most accurate measure of information specific to the date. Second, abnormal returns may also reflect other information that the acquisition process reveals. For example, an acquisition of a NP hospital may provide a negative signal about the availability of internally-generated investment opportunities. This would also bias returns downwards. Moreover, the same critique applies to the analysis of CARs in the aftermath of regulation. If CARs fall, ex post, this may indicate that regulations reduced acquirer CARs. However, acquiring a NP hospital in a regulated state may also give a negative signal to the market about acquirer investment opportunities.
In section 4 we provide several tests of robustness in an attempt to rule out alternative explanations for our results. To address Schipper-Thompson concerns, we reestimate our results using only the first or first three acquisitions made by each acquirer.
If Schipper-Thompson concerns are relevant, initial transactions should be informative than later transactions. To address the concern that acquiring firms in regulated states are signaling poor investment prospects, we examine the identities of acquiring firms in these states and test whether their acquisitions are confined to regulated environments.
Studies of the Acquisition Prices and Numbers of Acquisitions
To better understand the event study results, we also analyze the announced sale prices of the targets using observations where this information is disclosed. Target sale prices in relation to the expected post-acquisition earnings of the target theoretically determine the abnormal returns earned by the acquirer. We present medians of acquisition prices divided by beds and net income.
hospital acquisition. Longer window lengths, however, allow for more gradual transmission of information to the market, but are confounded with other non-transaction specific events.
We also examine the number of acquisitions that occur pre and post-regulation as a second and arguably more valid measure of the effects of regulation. We compute chi squared statistics to assess the significance of the difference. The results in Table 3 provide support for a strong test of fair market pricing.
Results
Fair Market Pricing in the Absence of Regulation
Abnormal Returns
Assuming the results are valid measures of acquirer returns, they suggest that NPs received fair market value for their assets. Moreover, given that acquisitions of IO targets yielded positive returns prior to 1997, the market for acquisitions may not have been perfectly competitively in the (IO/IO) market and instead characterized by bilateral negotiations during the earlier period. This is noteworthy because if we apply the symmetry assumption, it suggests that the (IO/NP) market wasn't perfectly competitive either and that NP managers and boards negotiated fair prices bilaterally. As our prior discussion suggests, this may be due to the fact that NP managers had high reservation prices for relinquishing control of their institutions. Table 4 provides evidence on IO returns where the chain sells one or more hospitals to different organizational types. We present these results as a check on the validity of acquirer CARs presented in Table 3 . Consistent with prior literature, we wish to show that in periods where acquirers earned positive CARs, targets did as well. Panel B of Table 4 shows this to be the case. In the period prior to 1997, where IO acquirers earned positive CARs from acquiring FP targets, the FP targets earned positive residuals as well.
Table 4 also indicates that overall and especially before 1997, IO targets realized significantly higher returns where they were purchased by IO rather than NP acquirers.
One explanation for this result is that acquisitions of IO hospitals by NP acquirers occurred in a less competitive acquisition market (e.g., the NP acquirer was the acquirer of last resort.) The fact that IO target CARs were negative where the acquirer was a NP indicates that the sale to a NP divulged negative information about the IO target hospital's value, ex ante to the sale 30 .
Tests of Robustness
We also test the sensitivity of these findings by further dividing the sample in several ways. Because Columbia/HCA provides 29% of our overall sample observations, 29 The number of (IO-IO) transactions post-1997 is quite small, so it's possible that our sample lacks sufficient power to confirm statistically significant negative returns in the post-1997 period. 30 In particular, a profit-maximizing IO chain would never sell a hospital at a price below its existing value. Therefore negative CARs earned by the IO target cannot be due to selling at prices below the target hospital's market value, but must instead indicate that the sale itself divulged other negative information about the target's ex ante value. We are in no position to deduce whether such sales occurred at prices above or below the target's fair market value.
we compute our results excluding the Columbia/HCA data. The results, shown in Table   5 , are virtually unchanged from Table 3 . We also divide the sample according to whether the target is: 1) financially distressed (has negative net income); 2) is part of a multifacility purchase (more than one hospital purchased); 3) has more or less than $1 billion in assets; or 4) disclosed the acquisition price. In no case does the IO acquirer earn a statistically significant CAR by acquiring a NP facility, either before or after 1997, regardless of how the sample is divided 31 .
A second set of tests focuses on Schipper-Thompson concerns. As noted earlier, abnormal returns may have previously been capitalized into the acquirers' share prices [Schipper-Thompson, (1983) ]. As a result, it is important to know whether the first few acquisitions made by each acquirer yielded higher CARs than later acquisitions. It is also important to know whether acquiring firms generally acquired their FP targets prior to acquiring their NP targets. If both of these conditions hold, then this would bias the difference in IO compared to NP returns in the positive direction. This would also bias the tests of NP abnormal returns towards zero.
To address these concerns we select only the first three acquisitions made by each acquirer and repeat the analysis in Table 3 32 . Table 6 presents the average level of abnormal returns for an acquirer's initial acquisitions. These results allow us to test whether the abnormal returns from early stage NP acquisitions are positive. Table 6 indicates that there is some basis for Schipper-Thompson concerns, but that the effect is confined to IO targets. Comparing Table 3 with Table 6 , we find that early (IO/IO) 31 Results of these additional analyses are available from the authors upon request. 32 We also repeat the analysis in Table 6 using just the first acquisition of each acquirer. Our findings are qualitatively the same as in Table 6 . Again we find that (IO-IO) acquisitions yielded positive and acquisitions have higher average CARs compared to the overall set of (IO/IO) acquisitions reported in Table 3 continue to hold.
As a final robustness check on our findings, we investigate acquisition prices paid for NP targets. Assuming that the synergistic values of NP and IO targets are equal, a finding that IO chains paid as much or more for NP targets would be consistent with our abnormal returns findings. Table 7 presents descriptive statistics of median acquisition prices for targets, both in relation to net income and bed size for a sample of acquisitions where the price was reported 33 . Turning to the results we find, first, that IO targets were generally larger than NP or private targets and hence received a higher nominal price.
The per-bed prices indicate a modest premium paid for NP targets. On a net income perbed basis, the pattern is reversed and more was paid for IO targets. Neither difference is significant, however.
Beds and net income levels provide an incomplete set of controls for the quality of the target. Moreover, they do not account for expected synergies. Given these limitations, however, we find no evidence that IO chains paid either more or less for NP significant CARs, both overall and in the period before 1997. We also find that (IO-NP) acquisitions yielded CARs indistinguishable from zero across all periods. 33 We work with median prices and provide non-parametric statistics because the distribution of prices appears to be skewed and non-normal. Comparisons based on means provide similar results.
targets in relation to IO targets. This finding is consistent with our abnormal returns reported in Tables 3 and 6 . Table 8 provides an analysis of acquirer CARs and the number of transactions for NP targets where the sample is divided according to whether states adopted regulations.
Abnormal Returns Following the Passage of Regulations
Given that acquirer CARs were zero prior to regulation, we do not anticipate significant reductions in acquirer CARs after regulation. As a result, we use changes in the number of acquisitions as our most reliable measure of the effect of regulation. We find that the number of NP acquisitions fell significantly in regulated states from 53 to 19 34 . On the other hand, the number of NP acquisitions in unregulated states showed only a small decline, falling from 62 to 55 after 1997. Thus, the decline in NP acquisitions after 1997 (see Figure 1 ) was a phenomenon almost entirely confined to states that adopted regulations. The fall in the number of acquisitions suggests that regulations placed a floor on the price of targets which exceeded their synergy value to the acquirer. In theory, regulations may have increased the price of targets or prices may have been maintained while regulations imposed costs that reduced the synergy value of the target.
Given that acquirer CARs were zero, ex ante, even a small effect on prices or costs would have been sufficient to reduce acquisition activity significantly.
We also find that CARs fell significantly in states that adopted regulation and became statistically negative within the three and four day windows. The decline in returns, as indicated in column 7, is significant across 3, 4 and 5 day windows. If we take into account the fact that returns were rising in non-regulated states, the effect of regulations is more negative. Column 8 provides this differences in differences result.
The results in column 8 are significant across all event windows and range from 2.2% to 4%.
While decreases in acquirer CARs are possible, negative values for CARs imply value decreasing behavior on the part of acquirers if the negative CAR is tied to the acquisition. An alternative interpretation is that negative CARs reflect other information that is revealed at the time of the acquisition. For example, it is possible that acquisitions of hospitals in regulated states signaled that the acquirer lacked good targets in unregulated states. To investigate this possibility, we identify the list of acquirers of hospitals in regulated states and check to see if they make subsequent acquisitions in unregulated states. We find that 12 separate acquirers made acquisitions in regulated states. Of these 12, 11 also made acquisitions in unregulated states subsequent to their regulated acquisition. Thus, regulated state acquisitions did not reliably signal that other unregulated opportunities were unavailable. Table 9 shows prices paid for NP targets in regulated and unregulated
environments. It appears that the prices paid for NP targets fell in the aftermath of regulation on both a price per-bed and price per net income basis, as indicated in column 7 of this table. The size of the targets fell as well. These results suggest that regulations imposed costs that reduced the synergy value of the target 35 . An alternative interpretation is that the decline in prices reflects a selection bias in which targets with less value are most likely to be acquired post-regulation. Targets with less value may be 34 This decline is statistically significant at the .01 level based on a chi-squared test. 35 Price declines cannot be due to a simple reallocation of target value towards the acquirer given that the number of acquisitions fell also. If value was being reallocated towards the acquirer, we would expect the number of acquisitions to grow.
relatively unaffected by the regulatory process. Our data do not permit us to test this alternative explanation for the decline in prices.
.2.2. Acquirer Abnormal Returns for IO and Private Targets
As a check on our regulatory results, we also analyze the CARs associated with acquisitions of IO and privately-owned hospitals in states that passed regulations 36 . We find no decline in acquirer CARs within this sample. After regulation, three-day CARs actually increased among IOs acquiring other IOs or privately-owned hospitals. Relative to the general decline in CARs that occurred in unregulated states after 1997, the CARs in regulated states increased across all event windows. Moreover, the prices paid per-bed for IO and privately-owned targets also increased in regulated states.
This is the result we would expect if the decline in CARs earned on NP targets was due to state-level regulations as opposed to a spurious cause. Moreover, the increase in price per-bed paid for IO and privately-owned targets may reflect the scarcity of "good targets" that emerged after the implementation of the state regulations.
Conclusion
Asset sales between IO and NP hospitals give rise to two related issues. The first is the question of whether these transactions are desirable on the basis of some agreed upon criterion, such as pareto efficiency 37 . The second question is whether the assets in transactions between NP and IO entities are assigned a fair market value. These are clearly distinct questions. For example, it is possible for a pareto efficient sale of a NP to occur at less than fair market value and vice versa. 36 These results are available from the authors upon request. 37 The issue of whether NPs should sell at all, and to whom, is the issue in this case. The answer depends, to some degree, on how one assigns a value to social outputs that are unique to NPs.
We focus on the topic of fair market value in this paper. The issue of fair market value does not address the larger issue of efficiency in this market, but is still important in its own right. First, the perception that NPs were being sold at less than market value was one motivation behind many state laws enacted between 1997-1998 that regulated the sale and conversion of NP hospitals. Second, if NP hospitals were purchased at less than fair market value, this may have been a powerful incentive for IO chains to pursue these transactions, independent of their overall efficiency.
We draw inferences about fair market exchange in this paper based on measures of cumulative abnormal returns. We argue that zero abnormal returns imply that the acquiring firm has capitalized all of the target's synergistic value into the price it pays and in this sense has met the fair market standard. Our evidence shows that sales of NP hospitals to IO chains meet this simple definition of fairness. Both before and after the passage of state laws, cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for NP purchases were nonpositive. Before 1997 they were also significantly less than those achievable from purchases of IO or privately-owned facilities. We also find that IO chains paid as much for their NP targets, relative to their IO targets, at the time of acquisition. We caution that our results are still subject to alternative interpretations, such as the well-known
Schipper-Thompson effect. However, several tests of robustness also support our principle findings.
Furthermore, we find that state laws regulating the sale and conversion of nonprofit hospitals were associated with reductions in the number of NP hospital acquisitions in these states. We interpret this result to imply that at a minimum, regulations placed a floor under acquisition prices with the result that prices exceeded 29 target values. We also find reductions in acquirer CARs and acquisition prices in regulated states. These findings are much more difficult to interpret and warrant further investigation.
Our evidence calls into question the need for state legislation for the specific purpose of enforcing fair market pricing. However, assessment of these regulations also depends on how these transactions are evaluated from a social welfare perspective. From this standpoint, a key question is how an IO acquirer will operate a NP hospital differently following an acquisition. 100% 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 This table summarizes the state laws passed to regulate the sale and conversion of nonprofit hospitals. We list, first, the state and the year of adoption. The "community assessment/access to care provision" column indicates whether the law requires the regulator or transacting parties to consider the health impact of the acquisition, the acquirer to submit a community benefit plan and/or requires the regulator to monitor the impact of the acquisition on health care. The independent valuation column indicates whether the regulator is required to obtain an independent valuation of the target prior to granting approval*. The "transactions before" and "transactions after" columns indicate the number of (IO-NP) transactions that occurred in our data set before and after the state law was passed. This table presents the mean cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) to the acquirer calculated over varying window lengths, between one day prior to one day post acquisition (-1, +1), to four days post acquisition (-1,+4), by target type. The sample is restricted to those transactions occuring either in states without regulation or in states prior to regulation being passed. Panel A presents mean CARs for our complete sample while Panel B presents mean CARs separately for two time windows, before and after 1997. The naming convention used to identify the type of transaction is abbreviated as "IO" for investor owned for-profit organizations, "PR" for private for-profit organizations and "NP" for nonprofit organizations. The abbreviation before the / indicates the form of the acquirer and the abbreviation following the / gives the organizational form of the target. Columns 4 and 5 show the differences between IO and NP, and PR and NP CARs respectively.
State
[ This table presents the mean cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) to the acquirer calculated over varying window lengths, between one day prior to one day post acquisition (-1, +1), to four days post acquisition (-1,+4), by target type. The sample eliminates all observations in which Columbia / HCA is the aquirer and is further restricted to those transactions occuring either in states without regulation or in states prior to regulation being passed. Panel A presents mean CARs for our complete sample while Panel B presents mean CARs separately for two time windows, before and after 1997. The naming convention used to identify the type of transaction is abbreviated as "IO" for investor owned for-profit organizations, "PR" for private for-profit organizations and "NP" for nonprofit organizations. The abbreviation before the / indicates the form of the acquirer and the abbreviation following the / gives the organizational form of the target. Columns 4 and 5 show the differences between IO and NP, and PR and NP CARs respectively.
[ This table presents the mean cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) to the acquirer calculated over varying window lengths, between one day prior to one day post acquisition (-1, +1), to four days post acquisition (-1,+4), by target type. The sample is limited to the first three observations by each of the acquiring systems in our full sample. Consistent with Table 3 we further restrict the sample to those transactions occuring either in states without regulation or in states prior to regulation being passed. Panel A presents mean CARs for our complete sample while Panel B presents mean CARs separately for two time windows, before and after 1997. The naming convention used to identify the type of transaction is abbreviated as "IO" for investor owned for-profit organizations, "PR" for private for-profit organizations and "NP" for nonprofit organizations. The abbreviation before the / indicates the form of the acquirer and the abbreviation following the / gives the organizational form of the target. Columns 4 and 5 show the differences between IO and NP, and PR and NP CARs respectively.
Table 7 Median Values of Characteristics by Transaction Type
This table presents the median values of acquisition prices, beds, price per-bed, and net income per-bed by transaction type for transactions in which the IO was the aquirer. The sample is restricted to those transactions occuring either in states without regulation or in states prior to regulation being passed. The naming convention used to identify the type of transaction is abbreviated as "IO" for investor owned for-profit organizations, "PR" for private for-profit organizations and "NP" for nonprofit organizations. The abbreviation before the / indicates the form of the acquirer and the abbreviation following the / reflects the organizational form of the target. Columns 4, 5, and 6 show the difference between IO/IO, IO/NP and IO/PR transactions respectively. 
Mean Values of Acquirer CARs by State Regulatory Status
This table presents the mean cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for acquirers of nonprofit target hospitals. The sample is divided into states that did and did not pass regulations. For transactions that occurred in states without any regulation, the sample is further divided into pre and post-1997 periods, which corresponds with the introduction of laws in states which chose to adopt them. For transactions that occurred in states that passed regulations, the sample is divided into pre and post regulation periods. Differences in CARs are provided in the second half of the table.
